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“All models are wrong but some are useful” (Box, 1979,
p. 202). This statement is particularly useful when it comes
to the topic of studying of heterogeneity in autism. Expan-
ding on ideas initially presented in Mottron and
Bzdok (2020), Mottron’s (2021) new commentary in this
journal explicitly calls out how the current model for how
we study autism is wrong and that there are other models
(i.e., “prototypical autism”) that may be more useful. I
think the field would resoundingly agree that the current
model, resting on blind usage of the single diagnostic label,
is less than ideal when it comes to furthering scientific
research. Happé et al.’s (2006) paper was certainly one of
the first to avert my attention to the issue. Many subse-
quent papers have come since then elaborating on the idea
that heterogeneity in autism is a central scientific challenge
for the field and also to discuss ways to address this chal-
lenge (e.g., Geschwind & Levitt, 2007; Gillberg, 2010; Lai
et al., 2013; Lombardo et al., 2019; London, 2007;
Müller & Amaral, 2017; Waterhouse & Gillberg, 2014).
While we would agree that the single diagnostic label
is not ideal, we likely disagree somewhat with how a con-
cept like “prototypical autism” might be an important
alternative to the current situation. By studying prototyp-
ical autism, Mottron (2021) suggests we would reap the
benefits of much larger effect sizes and thus gain more
clarity in terms of a mechanistic understanding of autism.
The claim of a bigger effect sizes as one goes further back
into the past (Rødgaard et al., 2019) is not without some
problems though. Sample size in autism research has also
increased over time, and it is well known that effect sizes
can be inflated (and sometimes by very large margins) in
situations with small sample sizes (see simulations within
Lombardo et al., 2019). In Figure 1, I have re-plotted
data from Rødgaard et al. (2019), to show both the year-
by-effect size and sample size-by-effect size relationships,
with Spearman’s ρ annotated on each plot. For the repro-
ducible data and code for this re-analysis, see here:
https://github.com/IIT-LAND/autism_es_time_n. For
studies of social cognition and the P3b amplitude, both
relationships between year and effect size, and sample
size and effect size are present. Also notable is the
decrease in variance of effect size as sample size increases,
showing the well understood phenomenon that as sample
size increase, the precision of the estimated statistic
increases and likely converges on what the true popula-
tion parameter is likely to be. This effect alone under-
scores the primary importance of larger sample sizes.
Since effect size inflation is also a known issue
(Lombardo et al., 2019), it is unclear whether higher
effect sizes in the past are indeed precise estimates,
because effect sizes are more imprecise with smaller sam-
ple sizes and older studies have much smaller sample sizes
than studies of today (i.e., in all cases, except studies of
non-social cognitive tasks, sample size and year are also
significantly positively correlated). Trying to statistically
covary out sample size, as Rødgaard et al. (2019) did is
not really the best remedy for this situation, since remov-
ing variation associated with sample size also removes
shared variance for year, due to the fact that year and
sample size are positively correlated.
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However, let us assume that it is the case that study-
ing prototypical autism results in larger effect sizes. There
is still a primary conceptual issue at the heart of this
argument. Mottron’s view of prototypical autism
squarely dismisses ideas about heterogeneity, diversity,
and individual differences as being nothing more than
artifact—in fact, Mottron and Bzdok (2020) declare this
take-home message unequivocally in the title of their
paper: “Autism spectrum heterogeneity: fact or artifact”.
Mottron’s view implies that autism is best conceived of
as singular unitary entity and not as a spectrum with
important individual differences. The success of this kind
of prototypical autism model depends somewhat on
whether this underlying assumption is indeed valid and
more correct than other models that would not assume
that autism is one singular entity.
Besides this issue, I can see other problems with
applying Mottron’s approach in practice. First, what is
prototypical autism? Mottron suggests that prototypical
autism is a distinction that is clear to clinical experts, but
it is never properly given a clear definition. Second,
amongst the multiple levels one could examine in autism,
the proposition of studying prototypical autism is one
that places priority or importance at levels like behavior,
cognition, and the clinical phenotype. What about other
models that instead look for genetic or neural distinctions
(e.g., Hong et al., 2020)? Why would the approach of
looking at what is “prototypical” about autism at cogni-
tive, behavioral, or clinical levels be more important than
a definition of what is “prototypical” or most common
about autism at other more biological levels of analysis?
A hardliner approach would be to declare that study-
ing Mottron’s “prototypical autism” as the best and only
way to move forward. Taking this hardliner route is
probably equally as wrong as the current situation. I
would rather view what Mottron proposes in a slightly
different light and also as just one of many different types
of possible approaches for understanding heterogeneity
in autism. Focusing on “prototypical autism” is just
one of many possible “supervised” models for studying
heterogeneity in autism (for more on “supervised”
vs. “unsupervised” approaches to studying heterogeneity
in autism, please see Lombardo et al., 2019). With the
right set of justifications and the explicit end goals pre-
specified, along with nuanced interpretation and care to
not overgeneralize, there is no reason why studying “pro-
totypical autism” could not yield insights for the field.
In terms of how to construe what is: prototypical,” we
could benefit by looking at analogies taken from other
approaches. For example, normative modeling approaches
(Bethlehem et al., 2020; Marquand et al., 2016) are one of
many ways to study heterogeneity and are well suited for
detecting outlier individuals that markedly differ from
age-appropriate norms defined from a non-autistic
F I GURE 1 Relationships between time, sample size, and effect size in autism research (a re-analysis of data from Rødgaard et al., 2019). Panel
(a) shows relationships for studies classified as social cognition (e.g., emotion recognition and theory of mind). Panel (b) shows the same plots for
studies of non-social cognitive tasks (e.g., flexibility, planning, inhibition). Panel (c) shows plots for studies of the P3 amplitude, while Panel (d) shows
plots for studies of brain size. In each plot, each study is a single dot and Spearman’s ρ is shown to describe the relationship. The coloring of the dots
reflects the log10(sample size) (hotter colors reflecting larger sample size studies). The size of each study’s dot also changes according to sample size
(bigger reflecting larger sample size). The linear best-fit line is also shown, and this best fit is estimated with robust linear modeling in order to be
insensitive to outliers. Reproducible data and analysis code for this re-analysis can be found here: https://github.com/IIT-LAND/autism_es_time_n
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comparison population. With normative modeling, one
first defines what the non-autistic comparison population
norms are, and then autistic individuals are described sta-
tistically relative to those norms. The concept of “proto-
typical autism” seems somewhat analogous with respect to
idea that first, a norm or prototype needs to be defined,
and this would help make the definition of the “prototype”
a bit more objective. However, the population that the
norm is estimated on would need to be the autism popula-
tion itself. If one could define the degree to which an autis-
tic individual conforms to the autism norm or prototype, a
whole range of phenomena could then be studied with
respect to how individuals may deviate from that proto-
type. An example of how this can be done comes from our
recent work where we characterized the joint distribution
of social-communication (SC) and restricted repetitive
behavior scores from the autism population and then used
those norms to create subgroups (Bertelsen et al., 2021).
An advantage to construing the idea of “prototypical
autism” within this kind of “normative modeling” frame-
work is the allowance for the norm to be defined on the
basis of any collection of measured variables, which could
come from any level of analysis. Furthermore, what is
considered the definition of the norm or prototype is now
empirically defined in statistical terms (e.g., a z-score based
on the mean and SD of the autism population). The
approach also does not a priori place higher importance
on a few phenotypic levels (e.g., behavior, cognition) and
could be implemented on any set of variables characteriz-
ing the autism population (e.g., cortical thickness pheno-
types derived from structural MRI). Thus, rather than
rejecting the idea of heterogeneity and assuming autism is
one thing, this approach could take the concept of “proto-
typical autism,” formally define it based on empirically-
derived statistical norms from the autism population, and
then allow researchers to select and restrict their samples
accordingly. The inferences one could generate from this
approach would then need to be specific to the subset of
the population and the set of variables that originally
defined by the norm or prototype under study. In this
way, the model’s usefulness is preset based on a priori
supervised justifications for how and why the researcher
first defines the prototype under study. The model may
not be panacea to all problems we face, and thus it may be
wrong in many respects, but at least it would be explicitly
clear from the start what it is useful for.
In sum, a view that interprets prototypical autism to
be one of many possible strategies for dealing with het-
erogeneity in autism could reap significant insights if
applied in a nuanced way, where the goals and justifica-
tions are clearly spelled out, the disadvantages are clearly
understood, and the interpretations are not over- or
under-generalized. There is room for many possible
models. All will likely be wrong in some way, but it is
very possible that different models are useful in different
ways. We should exploit all possible models for their
unique utility until better models come along that are
empirically demonstrated to be less wrong.
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